Conference Programme

Planned Schedule

You can download a PDF of the programme with all informations here: download

Monday, July 16th 2018
09:0010:30Opening Session
09:3010:15Parallel Session 1
10:4511:15 Coffee Break
11:1512:30Parallel Session 2
12:3014:00 Lunch
14:0015:15Plenary Session I
15:1515:45 Coffee Break
15:4517:00Parallel Session 3
17:0018:00 Coffee Break
17:0018:00SING Representatives Meeting
18:1519:30Guided Tour
City of Bayreuth
19:30 Reception
Detailed Agenda Day 1
Tuesday, July 17th 2018
09:0010:30Parallel Session 4
10:3011:00 Coffee Break
11:0012:30Parallel Session 5
12:3014:00 Lunch
14:0015:15Planery Session II
15:1515:45 Coffee Break
15:4516:30Parallel Session 6
16:3016:45 Coffee Break
16:4517:30Parallel Session 7
18:1519:30Guided Tour
Bayreuth beer catacombs
Detailed Agenda Day 2
Wednesday, July 18th 2018
09:0010:30Parallel Session 8
10:3011:00 Coffee Break
11:0012:30Parallel Session 9
12:3014:00 Lunch
14:0015:15Planery Session III
15:1515:30 Announcement
SING Prize
15:3015:45 Coffee Break
15:4516:00Closing Session
16:0016:30SING Assembly
18:1519:45Guided Tour
Bayreuth Eremitage
20:00 Gala Dinner
Detailed Agenda Day 3

Plenary Speakers

Ken Binmore

Ken Binmore
"Ambiguity in Games"

Bayesian decision theory was invented by Leonard Savage, who is on record as saying that it would be "preposterous" and "utterly ridiculous" to apply his theory except in a small world. But modern Bayesians proceed as though Savage's theory is always the rational way to make choices in all circumstances. What is a small world? Why did Savage restrict his theory to small worlds? Where did Savage think priors come from? What are the implications for behavioral applications? How could Savage's theory be generalized to apply to at least some large worlds? What are the implications for game theory?

Short Bio

Ken Binmore is a mathematician turned economist and philosopher. He has held Chairs at LSE, the University of Michigan, and University College London. A range of applied work includes the design of major telecom auctions in many countries across the world. As a consequence of the $35 billion raised by the telecom auction he organized in the UK, he was described by Newsweek magazine as the “ruthless, poker-playing economist who destroyed the telecom industry”. He has contributed to game theory, experimental economics, evolutionary biology and moral philosophy. He currently works in decision theory. His books include Natural Justice (OUP), Does Game Theory Work? (MIT Press), A Very Short Introduction to Game Theory (OUP), Rational Decisions (PUP), and the introduction to John Nash’s Essays on Game Theory (Edward Elgar). He is a Visiting Professor of Economics at the Universities of Bristol and Warwick, and a Visiting Professor of Philosophy at LSE.

Paul Klemperer

Paul Klemperer
"Multiproduct Auctions and Game Theory"

coming soon...

Short Bio

Paul Klemperer is Edgeworth Professor of Economics at Oxford University. He co-invented the concept of "strategic complements"; developed the theory of consumer switching costs and the "supply function" analysis of energy markets; and has showed how to apply intuitions and techniques from auction theory in a range of other economic contexts, from finance to political economy.

He has also invented new auction designs; the "Product-Mix Auction" he developed during the financial crisis is regularly used by the Bank of England -- then-Governor, Mervyn King, described it as "a marvellous application of theoretical economics to a practical problem of vital importance". He has advised numerous governments, including devising (together with Ken Binmore) the UK government's "3G" mobile-phone license auction that raised £22.5 billion, and assisting the US Treasury in the financial crisis.

Larry Samuelson

Paul Klemperer
"The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference"

"Crowds'' are often regarded as "wiser'' than individuals, and prediction markets are often regarded as effective methods for harnessing this wisdom. If the agents in prediction markets are Bayesians who share a common model and prior belief, then the no-trade theorem implies that we should see no trade in the market. But if the agents in the market are {\em not} Bayesians who share a common model and prior belief, then it is no longer obvious that the market outcome aggregates or conveys information. In this paper, we examine a stylized prediction market comprised of Bayesian agents whose inferences are based on different models of the underlying environment. We explore a basic tension---the differences in models that give rise to the possibility of trade preclude generally the possibility of perfect information aggregation.

Short Bio

Larry Samuelson is the A. Douglas Melamed Professor of Economics and the Director of the Cowles Foundation for Economic Research at Yale University. He has worked in various of game theory, with a focus on evolutionary games (including the book, /Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection/) and repeated games (including the book, with George Mailath, /Repeated Games and Reputations: Long Run Relationships/). He is the current president of the Game Theory Society.

14th European (formerly Spain-Italy-Netherlands) Meeting on Game Theory 16th - 18th July 2018 in Bayreuth, Germany.

16th-18th July '18
University of Bayreuth, Universitaetsstr. 30,
Bayreuth, Germany